Do Populist-Led Administrations Always Crash the Economic System?
“Exchange, exchange.” Beneath the scorching heat, dozens of currency traders are offering US dollars on Florida Street, a bustling shopping street in Buenos Aires. Known as arbolitos (“little trees”), they are thriving ahead of the 26 October congressional elections in a nation accustomed to holding the US dollar.
“The optimal moment for purchasing is now,” states one arbolito, declining to give her identity. “[The dollar] went down slightly but it’s deceptive – it’ll rise again.”
Similar to her, economic experts from all backgrounds anticipate a devaluation of the national currency after the voting concludes. President Javier Milei has placed a limit on the currency to control soaring price increases and now it remains overvalued and reserves are exhausted, causing the national economy stagnant as buyers opt for low-cost foreign goods.
Fertile Ground
Argentina represents a unique situation. Argentina has been repeatedly hit by sovereign defaults and financial turmoil and its voters have been susceptible over the years to leftwing populism, such as the influential Peronism, and currently the president’s rightwing version.
The president epitomizes populist leadership: charismatic, unconventional, promising muscular measures to reclaim command of the economy from traditional elites for the benefit of ordinary citizens.
These key characteristics are shared by his political partner to the north, and by the UK politician, who presents himself as a pint-swilling champion of the common man even though he is a public school-educated ex-finance professional.
Up until lately, Milei’s approach – including widespread sell-offs and severe budget reductions – had won plaudits from international lenders for helping to control price rises under control. This plan shares similarities with that of Milei’s idol Margaret Thatcher, who similarly viewed inflation as a monster to be slain, no matter the cost.
But investors started to doubt in Milei’s radical project lately following a poor performance in provincial elections and a series of graft allegations. Only massive economic support by the US has prevented what seemed destined to be a full-blown currency crisis.
Contradictions
The 2016 referendum several years ago likely contained similar reasoning, and its leader, Boris Johnson, swept away doubts regarding fiscal impacts with a bullish determination to enact the “will of the people” despite elite opposition.
Farage to date committed few policies in writing except for a call for mass deportations, which he subsequently seemed to adjust spontaneously. He aims to rein in the central bank, perhaps even ditching its governor, the incumbent, with distrust toward traditional institutions being a key part of populist rhetoric.
His fiscal plans seem in flux: concerned about facing criticism for planning a Liz Truss-style splurge, he lately dropped a promise for significant tax cuts. His Reform party deputy, Richard Tice, stated they would concentrate instead on reductions in government expenditure.
Labour aims this position will enable it to portray Farage as planning to reintroduce austerity – an argument the chancellor has emphasized often, contrasting it with her approach of boosting government spending.
Jo Michell says there are contradictions within the populist platform, as it stands. “The party is funded by very wealthy people demanding lower taxes and reduced rules, but also talking a lot about the complaints of working people and the loss of industrial jobs,” he explains. “There’s a tension here among rich backers seeking radical free-market policies, and this story of bringing back British jobs and reindustrialisation.”
Maintaining Control
In truth, research indicates neither left nor right populists tend to fare well when confronting practical difficulties (though of course every populist leader promises something unique).
Recent research from a leading journal examined the outcomes of 51 populist presidents and prime ministers, over more than a century. It found that on average, after 15 years, gross domestic product per head tends to be a tenth less in countries run by populist rulers than in comparable countries under conventional leadership.
“Economic disintegration, decreasing macroeconomic stability and the decay of governance usually go hand in hand with populist rule,” argue the paper’s authors.
Another intriguing finding from the study, however, is that despite their economic costs, these leaders tend to be good at retaining office, lasting on average eight years, compared with shorter tenures for mainstream politicians.
Put simply, it is not clear whether even if their plans crash, such leaders face immediate consequences in elections. Like the Brexiters’ promise to regain sovereignty, their appeal reaches beyond mundane economics.
Yet returning to Buenos Aires, whether the government’s agenda fails or is kept on life support through foreign assistance, the Argentine people are already bearing significant costs.